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I use a unique large panel data set of consumer financial transactions to study 
whether the increase in income tax exemption limit on long term saving in 
India induces more private saving. The total income tax exemption limit for 
the long term savings which include principle repayment for home loan, public 
provident fund, long term fixed deposit etc. was increased by 50,000 India 
Rupee (833 US Dollar) in July 2014. I find that 21.54 % of the home loan 
owners increase the principle repayment for their home loan and the average 
level of the incremental amount is 16,425 India Rupee in the next year 
following the policy change. Relative to their closely matched counterparties 
with no home loan, the home loan borrowers on average reduce 193 US 
dollars on consumption by the end of fiscal year 2014-2015. Such relative 
reduction in consumption persists in the next fiscal year. The relative 
reduction on consumption is more pronounced for the male, young, single and 
low income individuals. Thus, I argue that, for a sub group of the population, 
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Does tax preferred saving polices induce individuals to save more instead of 
merely shifting savings from tax deductible accounts to tax subsidized 
accounts? A large number of papers attempt to empirically address this 
question. However, the conclusion is still mixed largely because of data 
limitation (Bernheim, 2002). 
Chetty (2015) puts and I quotes here that “It is critical to determine whether 
these larger retirement contributions come at the expense of less saving in 
non-retirement accounts or actually induce individuals to consume less (as 
required to raise total savings rates). Most studies to date have not been able 
to estimate such crowd-out eﬀects because they do not have data on 
individuals’ full portfolios.” The only paper resolving this issue is Chetty et. 
al. (2014) which utilizes the Danish data containing the information on private 
savings in all accounts.  However, having the data on a complete set of saving 
account is rare or even inapplicable to some economies.  
We propose another way to tackle the problem by directly estimating the 
reduction in consumption which is the other side of the coin when the income 
level is well controlled. Different from the results of many empirical studies 
on the developed economy like U.S. or Denmark, we find that, in India, for a 
sub group of the population, the increase in tax preferred saving account limit 
can induce a significant increase in private savings reflected in the reduction in 
consumption levels.  
The India income tax exemption policy reform announced in July 2014 
provides a quasi-experimental research design to identify the impacts of tax 
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subsidized saving policies. The annual total income tax exemption limit is 
raised by 50,000 India Rupee (833 US dollars1). In India, all the exemptible 
items are classified into different categories and the total exemptible amount 
for each category cannot exceed a certain limit. The exemption limit of the 
sections for long term investments (80C) and interest payment of home loans 
(Section 24) was increased by 50,000 India Rupee respectively. The income 
tax exemptible long term savings include the repayment for the principle part 
of home loan, public provident fund, long term fixed deposit, health insurance, 
tuition fee etc.  
Though all taxable individuals who have total income tax subsidized saving 
below the new limit are affected by the policy, we argue that the individuals 
with home loans are more likely to reduce consumption and increase saving in 
response to the policy. Firstly, loss aversion behavior bias predicts that people 
will be more responsive in reducing negative saving (avoid interest payment 
loss) compared with increasing the positive saving (gain interest return) and 
the extra income tax incentive may have asymmetric impact on the households 
in debt and without debt. Secondly, individuals with mortgage loans have less 
closely substitutable taxable savings to shift because it is costly to save and 
borrow at the same time. Thirdly, it is relative costless to increase mortgage 
loan principle repayment compared with other saving vehicles. For example, 
pension fund and fixed deposit require at least 15 years and 5 years lock- in 
periods respectively and they also have the minimum saving requirements. 
Many households no longer have the exposure to the saving channels like life 
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insurance, tuition fee and national saving certificate. Moreover, for these 
saving vehicles, there are no continuous choice variables available. In contrast, 
the household can repay one more dollar for the principle part of their 
mortgage loans. Therefore, we could directly estimate the relative change of 
consumption of mortgage loan borrowers compared with its close 
counterparties (non-home loan borrowers) to measure the effect on stimulating 
personal saving for the mortgage loan borrowers. 
Our study solves various empirical issues in the literature in the following way. 
Firstly, we have a three year panel debit card and credit card transaction data 
from a bank of India with the largest market share to measure consumption. 
Our consumption measure has much less measurement error compared with 
the measures from survey results. Secondly, we have rich demographical data 
of individuals. To estimate the treatment effect, we could match on income, 
gender, age, marital status and residential address to construct a control group 
with very similar covariates distribution as the treatment group. The control 
group can therefore absorb the other confounding effects and unobservables in 
an accurate measure. Thirdly, our setting does not require full saving 
portfolios to study whether the policy indeed boosts the private saving. Instead, 
we directly test on whether the policy affected individuals reduce consumption. 
Fourthly, most importantly, the panel data allows us to explicitly test the 
assumption that the treatment and control group have the same disposition to 
save/consume in the period before the policy change. In the previous survey 
data oriented research, such tests are not applicable and researchers face the 
question that the treatment group and control group may have different 
disposition to save even though they have made the best effort in matching. 
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Moreover, superior to the studies based on policy change in eligibility for the 
tax deductible saving accounts, we do not face the issue that the policy change 
may be endogenous to the disposition-to-save of some individuals because our 
policy change is applicable to all taxable individuals.  
Our findings are summarized as follows. Firstly, about 29.34% home loan 
borrowers increase the annual repayment on the principle part of home 
mortgage loan and the average amount is 273.75 US dollars (32.85% of 
increased exemption limit). Secondly, relative to its closely matched 
counterparties, the mortgage borrowers reduce consumption by 192.54 US 
dollars in the fiscal year 2014-2015 which is equivalent to 44.79% of the 
average total one month spending. In another way of speaking, with 1 dollar 
increase in income tax exemption limit, for a sub group of the population, 
there is at least an average of 0.23 dollar increase in private saving. Thirdly, 
we find such reduction in consumption persists in the next fiscal year 2015-
2016. Up to 20 months after the policy announcement, the average reduction 
on consumption of the home loan borrowers relative to its control group is 
359.21 US dollars. Lastly, in the heterogeneity tests, we find that the low 
income, younger, single and male home mortgage borrowers relatively reduce 
more on consumption.  
In addition, we conduct two tests to validate our methodology and pin down 
the channel. By dividing the sample on whether the individuals increase the 
repayment on the principle part of the mortgage loan, we find that only for 
those loan borrowers who increase the principle repayment by more than 10K 
India Rupee, there is significant decline in consumption level relative to their 
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counterparties. On the contrary, for those who do not increase the principle 
repayment amount, we do not find any significant difference on consumption 
level between home loan borrowers and their counterparties. Therefore, we pin 
down the channel that the reduction in consumption of the home loan 
borrowers is due to their increased repayment on mortgage loan. Moreover, 
we also find that there is an average 15,287 India Rupee (254.78 US dollars) 
increase in the PPF account (another saving vehicle under section 80C) annual 
top-up in FY 2014-2015. Since PPF account holders and non PPF account 
holders do not subject to two distinct features (loss aversion bias and liquidity 
constrain) we argue for the home loan borrowers and non-borrowers, we 
expect to find no significant difference on consumption level between the two 
groups if our identification strategy is valid. With the same matching and diff-
in-diff methodology, we do not find any significant difference in consumption 
level between the PPF account holders and their control group in the post-
policy announcement period.  
Also, we conduct a series of placebo and robustness tests. Firstly, we examine 
whether the relative decline in consumption of the home loan owners is due to 
some unknown seasonal trend. We conduct the same tests on the matched 
sample in one fiscal year ahead (FY 2013-2014) and we find there is no 
statistically  and economically significant difference between the treatment 
and control group in all consumption measures. Secondly, to address the 
concern that home loan borrowers differ from non-home loan borrowers in 
unobservable ways, we completely drop the non-home loan borrowers, and 
perform the tests by exploiting the heterogeneity in the loan principle 
repayment characteristics. Lastly, we investigate the robustness of our 
9 
 
statistical inference-consistency of standard errors, and conduct our tests using 
alternative specifications.  
What we can estimate is a lower bound of the average increase in private 
saving in the following sense. Firstly, the control group may also increase their 
saving through the other vehicles that are also eligible for the increased 
income tax exemption limit and reduce consumption as well. Thus the diff- in-
diff estimator underestimates the reduction in consumption of the home loan 
borrowers. Secondly, the non-home loan borrowers in the control group 
identified in our setting may have home loan accounts with other banks which 
we cannot observe. Thirdly, consumers may have accounts with other banks or 
there may be consumption conducted in cash without going through the 
banking system. Our sample mean is similar with the surveyed evidence on 
average monthly spending and our data is from the bank in India with the 
largest market share in consumer banking. This alleviates the third concern’s 
impact on our estimation to some extent.  
This paper contributes to the large literature in public finance examining 
whether government subsidized saving policy can stimulate private saving. 
Our paper is the first to directly test on whether individuals reduce 
consumption to increase the saving in the tax subsidized accounts with debit 
card and credit card transaction level panel data. Prior research on developed 
economy shows that individuals who respond to the tax incentive saving 
policy primarily shift savings across accounts rather than raising the total 
amount of saving. However, our study on the developing country shows that 
there are non-negligible percentage of population who do actively cut 
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consumption to increase saving in the tax preferred saving account when its 
total limit is raised.  
This paper is structured as the following. We will review the related literature 
in the second session. In the third section, we discuss the policy background 
and institutional details. The development of hypothesis and empirical 
methodology are laid out in the fourth section. The fifth section describes the 
sample and data cleaning process. We report he empirical results in the sixth 
section. The paper is concluded in the last section.  
2. Literature Review 
The literature on studying the policies on tax subsidized saving accounts is 
large. Poterba, Wise , & Venti (1996), Engen, Gale, & Scholz (1996) and 
Bernheim  (2002) provide comprehensive reviews. The study is mainly on the 
tax preferred type of saving accounts like IRA, 401(k) and Roth 401(k) in the 
US. The first fundamental question that the empirical literature aims to answer 
is that whether such tax subsidized saving policy can increase the amount of 
private saving. The classical life cycle hypothesis (Ando & Modigliani, 1963) 
implies that individuals should always exhaust the tax preferred saving limit 
and thus predicts that such policy can boost the private saving level. With the 
model of time- inconsistent preference (Laibson 1997, 1998) and bounded 
rationality (Conlisk, 1996) , the theoretical prediction is also positive through 
the channels of enhancing private rules and improving the perception of costs 
and benefit from saving.  
However, there are many empirical challenges in testing the hypothesis. 
Researchers try to test on the causal relationship by exploiting the va riation in 
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balance on the tax subsidized saving accounts (Venti and Wise, 1986-1988), 
eligibility (Benjaming, 2003 and Gelbera, 2011), initiation of topping up in the 
tax subsidized saving accounts (Attanasio and DeLeire, 1994), and the policy 
change on eligibility (Gale and Scholz, 1994). Then they examine whether 
there is significant change of taxable saving or total wealth for the individuals 
in the treatment and control groups. They measure taxable saving and total 
wealth mainly from survey data. The conclusion is mixed based on different 
econometrics assumptions. Some find rise in private saving but some argue 
that the increase in private saving is negligible because the increase in the 
balance in the tax subsidized account is largely crowded out by the decline in 
saving in the taxable saving accounts. There are two major issues. One is the 
low quality and less frequent data. The other one is that all these settings face 
the query that unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and control 
group in disposition to save can bias estimated saving effects.  
The recent development of behavior economics showing that automatic 
enrollment significantly increases saving within retirement accounts. (Madrian 
and Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). But they do not know to what 
extent such increase is crowded out by the deduction in the other taxable 
savings. Chetty et. al. (2014) uses the Denmark data on all saving accounts 
and show that 85% of the individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive 
to subsidies and the other 15% of individuals are active savers who respond to 
tax subsidies by shifting 99% assets across accounts. Therefore, the subsidy 
policy is totally ineffective in inducing more private saving. However, the  
authors find that automatic contributions are more effective in increasing 
saving rates than the subsidy policies. Beshears et. al (2015) studies the effect 
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of the introduction of Roth IRAs. They argue that no evidence showing there 
is decline of saving when Roth IRA (deferred tax benefit) is introduced. 
However, the survey results indicate that this is not an active calculated 
decision but largely due to confusion and behavior bias of partition 
dependence.  
The papers most related to ours are Engelhardt (1996) and Arnberg and 
Barslund (2012). Engelhardt (1996) studies the effect of the cancellation of the 
Registered Home Ownership Savings Plan and find that private saving drops 
for the renters. Our study is distinguished from this paper for three major 
points. Firstly, this study relies on the survey data of reported asset value less 
debt to measure total private saving. Secondly, the exogenous policy change is 
the reduction on tax subsidized saving benefit. Thirdly, the objective 
population are the renters not household with mortgage loans. Arnberg and 
Barslund (2012) studies the crowding-out effect of Danish mandatory pension 
schemes for the renters and they find that each one Euro paid to the mandatory 
pension accounts results in reduction in other private savings from 0 to 30 
cents. Their paper’s policy environment is mandatory which is different from 
our setting.  
Our paper is also closely related to the studies of consumption and saving 
response using micro- level data. Recent studies have used the micro data to 
examine 2001 tax rebates in the US Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), Johnson, 
Parker, and Souleles (2006), and Agarwal et al. (2007). Others have looked at 
the effect of the 2008 tax rebates on  payday  loans  payments  (Bertrand  and  
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Morse  2009)  and  the  2001  and  2008  tax  rebates  on bankruptcy filing 
(Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang,  2012).  
Besides, there is a stream of literatures concerning the effect of mortgage 
loans on consumption. Stephens (2008) used predictable increase in 
discretionary income following the final payment of a vehicle loan to 
understand their consumption behavior. They find that 10% increase in 
discretionary income leads to 2% to 3% increase in nondurable consumption. 
Gan (2010) find that housing wealth has effect on consumption. For the 
majority of the households who do not refinance, consumption sensitivity 
appears to be due to the reduction in precautionary saving. Gernardi, Rosen 
and Willen (2010) use micro data to find that since early 1980s, mortgage 
markets have become less imperfect in this sense and securitization has played 
an important role in smoothing consumption.  
3. Income Tax Policy in India 
In India, income tax is a tax payable enacted by Union Budget from every 
fiscal assessment year on the total income earned 2 in the previous year by 
every person. Net Income or Taxable Income is obtained by subtracting the 
exemptible income and some deductions from the total income. The policy has 
been adjusted quite frequently over the years. The trend is to increase inco me 
threshold for each tax rate band, to enlarge the tax exemption limit and to 
include more items claimable for income tax exemption (Gupta 2013). 
Different tax rates are imposed for different net income level and the tax slabs 
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are defined differently for different age groups. The sketch of the policy 
structure is given in Appendix A.1.  
The India domestic saving rate was peaked around 34% in 2007 and started to 
decline since then. In 2014, it drops to about 31%.  Especially the household 
saving rate over GDP drops from 10% in 2010 to 5% in 2014. It is widely 
believed that the rapid economic growth of India in the past decades is largely 
due to the high domestic saving rate. In order to boost household level 
financial saving rate, for the fiscal year 2014 to 2015 (1st April 2014 to 31st 
March 2015), India raised the income tax exemption limit for the long term 
investment items. The news was announced on 10th July 2014 by the Finance 
Minister Arun Jaitley. Since 1999, the union budget is usually announced on 
the last working day of the month of February. Due to the election, for the 
fiscal year 2014-2015, the union budget was announced in July. The policy 
change detail is retrieved from “Key features of budget 2014-2015” 3. Personal 
income-tax exemption limit raised by 50,000 India Rupee (equivalent to 833 
US dollars), that is from 2 lakh 4 India Rupee to 2.5 lakh India Rupee for the 
individual taxpayers below the age of 60 years. Exemption limit was raised 
from 2.5 lakh India Rupee to 3 lakh India Rupee in the case of senior citizens 
(age from 60 to 80).  For the super senior citizens (age above 80), the total 
exemption limit is remained at 5 lakh. For example, if an individual below age 
of 60 has the total income of 500,000 in the FY 2013-2014, the total 
exemptible limit is 200,000, thus the lowest taxable net income is 300,000 for 
this individual. For the part beyond 250,000 and below 500,000, the tax rate is 




 1 lakh = 100,000 India Rupee 
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10% and therefore the agent needs to pay 50,000*10%=5,000 Rupee as the 
income tax. However, in the FY2014-2015 with the same amount of income, 
the exemptible limit is increased to 250,000 and thus the lowest taxable net 
income is reduced to 250,000. The agent does not need to pay any income tax 
if he has the total exemptible items up to the exemption limit. The annual 
maximum net benefit from the new policy is thus 5,000 Rupee for this agent. 
If the individual’s total annual income is below 250,000, the individual is not 
affected by the change of exemption limit and thus the net benefit is zero. 
There is a long list of categories for different exemptible items. For each 
category, there is also an exemption ceiling. In accommodation with the raise 
in total income tax exemption limit, the category level limit was also raised by 
50,000 India Rupee for Section 80C and Section 24. Section 80C is for the 
long term saving and its ceiling is increased from 1 lakh to 1.5 lakh. The full 
list of 80C is provided in Appendix A.2. Among all these income tax 
exemptible long term saving instruments, principle part of EMI (equated 
monthly installment) for the home mortgage loans and PPF (public provident 
fund) (Appendix A.3) are of our primary interest because we have the related 
data. The other long term saving vehicles includes fixed deposit of more than 
five years, health insurance, tuition fee etc. Among all the long term saving 
instruments, principle part of EMI is the only debt item. For the PPF, we have 
10,000 individuals’ monthly top-up data during the sample period. Section 24 
is for the interest payment part of self-occupied house property and its ceiling 
is increased from 1.5 lakh to 2 lakh by 50,000 India Rupee.  
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Will there be policy uncertainty in the next fiscal year and will the increased 
exemption limit be carried on in the next fiscal year? Ex ante, it is reasonable 
to believe that such expansionary fiscal policy will not reverse back in the near 
future. It is because the overall past trend is expansionary. Ex post, we can 
confirm that, for the FY 2015-2016, there is no further major change on 
income tax exemption policy. And for the FY 2016-2017, India government 
further increases the total exemption limit of income tax. 
4. Methodology 
The exogenous change of income tax exemption limit policy in India provides 
the quasi-experimental frame work for us to identify its effect on private 
saving. The policy affects all the taxable individuals below the age of 80 with 
the annual income larger than the first income slab5. For the previous literature 
utilizing the variation of eligibility due to policy change to identify the causal 
effect, there are critics that policy change on eligibility is not orthogonal to the 
deposition towards saving. The policy makers may be able to design the policy 
with the knowledge on a subsample of population’s intension to save. 
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 In our policy change context, there are two potential identification strategies by utilizing 
eligibility variation.  
 
Firstly, it is to look at the individuals around the age of 80. For the super senior citizens 
beyond the age of 80, there is no total income exemption limit change. There are two issues 
with methodology. On one hand, there are l imited sample for the individuals around of the 
age of 80. On the other hand, for the research question on whether tax subsidized saving 
policy can induce more private saving, the primary research and policy interest are on the 
young population.   
 
Secondly, it is to look at the individuals with annual total income around 250,000 which is the 
ceiling of the first income slab. For the people with total annual income within first income 
slab, the tax rate is zero and thus the change of exemption limit is irrelevant. However, this 
identification strategy is not applicable. Firstly, the sample size is largely reduced and we are 
only able to estimate a local treatment effect. Secondly, we only have the annual salary data 
to proxy for the annual income. W e do not have total annual taxable income data to identify 
the eligibility. Moreover, individual may have incentive to manipulate around the cut-off 




However, for our quasi-experimental setting, most population is eligible for 
the new increased income exemption limit but it requires individuals to take 
active actions to save in the tax subsidized accounts. Under 80C, the only tax 
subsidized loan accounts is for the principle repayment part 6 of self-occupied 
home mortgage and all the others are generally the saving accounts.  
We argue that the mortgage loan borrowers have less closely substitutable 
taxable savings than those with no loans. It is not reasonable to borrow with a 
higher cost and save with a lower return at the same time. Assuming the 
mortgage loan borrowers and non-mortgage loan borrowers respond to the 
policy in the same manner, we argue that there is less crowd-out effect from 
taxable saving accounts for the mortgage loan borrowers. Therefore, we take 
the mortgage borrowers as the treatment group and non-mortgage borrowers 
as the control group and perform the diff- in-diff (DID) analysis on their 
consumption level over the policy change. The mortgage owners will have to 
reduce more consumption to take advantage of the increased exemption limit 
and the DID estimator will yield the lower bound on how much more savings 
the mortgage borrowers on average make in response to the policy. Moreover, 
a lot of evidence has shown that people’s behavior is asymmetric and people 
are more sensitive to losses than to gains. Following the theoretical foundation 
(Kaheman and Tersky, 1979), there are supporting empirical evidence from 
housing market (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), mutual fund portfolio  
management (Frazzini, 2006), and insurance purchasing behavior (Sydnor, 
2010). In our context, the interest payment on loans is the losses and the 
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 In Nov 2011, the brank provided data waived the mortgage loan prepayment penalty. 
Therefore, for the mortgage loan borrowers, there is no extra cost by increasing repayment 
on principle part of the loan.   
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interest return on positive saving is the gain. The loss aversion behavior bias 
predicts that the mortgage loan owners tend to be more responsive to the 
increased exemption limit. Therefore, we also anticipate that mortgage loan 
borrowers are more likely to respond to the policy change and top-up more in 
the tax subsidized accounts.  
We will estimate the Difference-in-Difference regression equation and the 
dynamic leads and lags distributed regression equations as deliberated below.  
4.1 Difference in Difference 
                                ··· (1) 
We adopt the difference- in-difference methodology (Agarwal et. al. 2007, 
Agarwal and Qian 2014) to control for the effect of other confounding events 
and common trend of consumption over time. The key assumption underlying 
the methodology is that the disposition to consume/save would be the same for 
the treatment and control group without the exogenous policy change.      
represents the measure of consumption.      represents the dummy variable 
indicating whether the individual i has mortgage loan.          takes the 
value of one for the months in the post event window and zero otherwise.    
refers to the policy announcement month.     represents the year-month fixed 
effect.    represents the individual fixed effect.      is the white noise error 
term.  
To increase the precision of estimation, we would like to ensure the covariates 
distribution of the treatment and control group on the dimensions which 
determines an individual’s disposition to consume is similar.  We adopt the 
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propensity score matching on the dimensions of gender, annual income, age, 
marital status and residential location to match the treatment sample with the 
control sample.  
4.2   Distributed Lead and Lag Model 
We study the dynamics of spending with the following distributed lead and lag 
models: 
     ∑   
  
             ∑   
 
                        ···   (2) 
For regression equation (2),      represents the measure of consumption.  
     takes the value of 1 if the individual i has a home mortgage loan and 0 
otherwise.    to -1 refers to the  th month before the policy announcement 
month and 1 to T refers to tth month after the policy announcement month. 
   absorbs the year-month fixed effect and    absorbs the individual fixed 
effect.       is the white noise.  
The coefficients    to    measure the additional marginal response one month 
till the T months after the announcement of the policy respectively.  The 
coefficients     to    capture the difference of the trends in spending between 
the treatment group and the control group in each of the month in the pre-
treatment period. To gauge the expansionary impact of the fiscal policy, we 
define the cumulative coefficients    ∑   
 
    ··· (3) that describe the 
cumulative response in spending after s months. The coefficient    captures 
the cumulative response of the spending from month 0. On the other hand, 
   ,…    measure the cumulative spending differences between the treatment 
group and the control group by month   to 1 before the policy announcement 
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month, and we expect them to be economically and statistically insignificantly 
different from zero.  
We also study the heterogeneity in the response to the income tax exemption 
limit change policy. They are essentially subsample tests with different 
categorization criteria i.e. income level, gender, age and marital status. 
 
5. Data and Sample 
Our dataset is a unique panel data of individual customers’ detailed banking 
transaction records. The data was retrieved from a commercial bank in India 
with the largest market share in retail banking. Our data set is constituted of 
three major parts and will be described separated below.  
5.1 Mortgage Loan Data 
We have in total 500,350 valid mortgage loan data with three snap shots of 
loan status at September 2013, September 2014 and September 2015. For each 
mortgage loan, we know its total approved loan limit, loan terms, repayment 
starting date, value of primary security and its address at province-district 
level. For each snap shot of the loan status, we know its end of day balance, 
total interest payment up to date, floating interest rate and delinquency status. 
For the mortgage loan borrowers, we have data on her age, gender and mar ital 
status. By taking the difference of the end of day balance and total interest 
payment at Sep 2014 and Sep 2013, we can obtain the total principle 
repayment and interest payment during the fiscal year 2013-2014. Similarly, 
we also know the total principle repayment and interest payment during fiscal 
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year 2014-2015. The policy change is in July 2014 but we can only regard Sep 
2013-Sep 2014 as the pre event period and Sep2014-Sep2015 as the post event 
period.   
5.2 Debit Card Data 
We have the debit card transaction level data from April 2013 to April 2015 
which includes 2 complete fiscal years, namely FY2013-2014 and FY 2014-
2015. Therefore, we can test on the common trend assumption in one fiscal 
year before the policy change year and estimate the cumulative effect up to the 
end of policy affected fiscal year. We clean the data in the following manner. 
We exclude the individuals with no account creation date and the customers 
who open the account after the starting point of our sample which is 1st April 
2013. Many of the customers in our sample have no available valid income 
data and thus we exclude them from the analysis. The customers with no 
available residential information are excluded from the sample as well. We 
also exclude those infrequent account users. If the customer has at least one 6 
consecutive months of no transaction actions, we will drop them out of the 
sample. In the end, we have in total 84,764 individuals in the sample and 
12,670 are with home mortgage loans and 72,094 are without home mortgage 
loans. Two of the transaction records are used for measuring consumption. 
One is cash withdrawal or cash withdrawal via ATM. The other one is P.O.S 
(Point of Sale) transaction using debit card. For all the accounts included in 
the sample, the transaction level data are winsorized at 1% and 99% level.  
Unfortunately, the debit card data cannot be merged with the mortgage data. 
We do not know the detailed mortgage loan features but we have the mortgage 
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loan indicator to identify who are the mortgage loan borrowers. To construct 
the control group with similar covariates with the treatment group, we perform 
the propensity score matching on the dimensions of gender, age, annual 
income, marital status and residential address. To ensure the robustness of our 
estimator, we choose nearest one neighborhood matching with no replacement 
and caliper at 0.001. 
5.3 Debit Card and Credit Card Data 
We have another panel data set of both debit card transactions (cash 
withdrawal from ATM and P.O.S transactions) and credit card spending at 
monthly level. The individuals included in this sample are different from those 
with debit card only. The data has three advantageous features and one 
disadvantageous feature compared with the data set described in section 5.2.  
Firstly, the panel data ranges from April 2014 to Feb 2016. Hence, we can 
further examine whether the effect is persistent in the next fiscal year FY 
2015-2016. Long term effect is of primary interest to study the policy 
effectiveness. Secondly, with the credit card spending, we have even better 
and complete measure on consumption. Thirdly, this data set can be merged 
with the mortgage loan data set described in section 5.1. Hence, for those 
identified mortgage borrowers, we can directly observe whether they increase 
the principle repayment in response to the policy. The disadvantageous feature 
is that we do not have the annual income data and therefore we cannot match 
on this dimension to obtain the control group. We clean the data set in a 
similar manner. We exclude the observations with missing or invalid 
demographical data. If there is any consecutive six months of zero debit and 
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credit card transactions, we regard it as an infrequently used account and drop 
the account out of sample.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of three data sets.  Panel A is the summary 
statistics of the mortgage loan data.  We have in total 500,350 mortgage loan 
accounts with the average approved credit limit of 700,943 India Rupee. The 
median loan term is 180 months (15 years). The average repayment starting 
year is 2009.  The average value of the primary security is as high as 
1,317,695 India Rupee (21,961 US dollar).  Most of the mortgage loans are 
under floating interest rate scheme and the average interest rate at Sep 2014 is 
10%.  On average, the mortgage loan borrowers are as old as 54 and 62% of 
them are married.  
Panel B is the summary statistics of the debit card panel data. We report 
summary statistics of the treatment and control group for both before and after 
the propensity score matching. The treatment group consists of the individuals 
with the home mortgage loan and the control group consists of those without 
home mortgage loan with the bank. From the entire sample without matching, 
we can see that the treatment and control groups have significantly different 
demographic covariates. To obtain more precise estimations, we match the 
two groups on the dimensions of age, gender marital status, annual income and 
the residential address and we perform the propensity score matching for the 
metro and rural area and different income slabs separately. We restrict the 
matching to be nearest 1 neighborhood with no replacement and caliper at 
0.001. From the pairwise t-tests, we can see that the matched treatment and 
control group have statistically indifferent demographics and the average 
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difference is very small in magnitude. Though we have less available current 
account and saving account balance data, the matched control group have 
significantly higher savings than the treatment group. The evidence is 
consistent with our arguments that the mortgage borrowers have less closely 
substitutable savings to finance the tax deductible saving accounts in 
comparison with the non-mortgage borrowers.  
In the pre-treatment period, the control group on average withdraws 390.54 
more India Rupee than the treatment group and this number grows to 1,705.58 
in the post-treatment period. Also, the control group on average spends 300 
more India Rupee via P.O.S transactions than the treatment group in the pre-
treatment period and this number grows to 493.18 in the post-treatment period. 
In addition, we provide the unconditional average monthly spending plots over 
the entire sample period as shown in Figure 1.   This is our first hand result 
which has shown that relative to the control group, the treatment group 
reduces consumption level in the post-treatment period.   
Panel C is summary statistics of the debit card and credit card data. Here, we 
report the summary statistics for the matched treatment and control group. For 
this dataset, we do not have annual income data and we perform the propensity 
score matching on age, gender, marital status and residential address. The 
matched treatment and control group have statistically indifferent 
demographics and the average difference is mall in magnitude.  Similarly, for 
the cash withdrawal and P.O.S transactions in the pre-treatment period, the 
control group on average withdraws 4,547 less India Rupee than the treatment 




We begin by reporting home mortgage loan borrowers’ repayment behavior on 
the repayment of principle part of the loan. Later, we report the average and 
dynamic response on spending with the debit card data and the heterogeneity 
in response across different individuals. Following that, we report the average 
and dynamic response on spending with the debit and credit card data. In the 
end, we also show some evidence on what we have found for the PPF 
accounts.  
6.1 Change in repayment for the principle part of the mortgage loans  
For the home mortgage borrowers, to benefit from the raised income tax 
exemption limit, they can increase the amount of repayment for the principle 
part of the mortgage loans.  We want to examine how many people and to 
what extend they increase the repayment on the principle part and report the 
results as shown in Table 2. Panel A includes the mortgage accounts which 
do not increase the total repayment amount from FY 2013-2014 to FY 2014-
2015 which takes up 58.95% of the sample.  If the mortgage loan is repaid 
based on the equal monthly installment (EMI), as time goes by, the repayment 
for principle part increases and interest payment part decreases mechanically. 
The average increase in principle payment is 5,189 India Rupee which is about 
12% of the principle repayment amount in the base year. Panel B includes the 
mortgage accounts which increase the total repayment amount and there are 
21.54% of the accounts. The average increase in repayment for the principle 
part is 16,425 India Rupee and the median is 13,284 India Rupee which is 
equivalent to 39% of the principle repayment amount in the base year. 
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Compare with Panel A, we would like to argue that, the increase in principle 
repayment in Panel B is not simply due to automatic increase in the principle 
part of repayment. Most of such increase in principle repayments is triggered 
by the policy incentive. Panel C reports the mortgage loan borrowers who 
reduce the annual repayment amount and there are 19.51% of the samples. 
These people may repay more than required in the previous year due to some 
personal reason and reduce the amount of principle repayment in the 
subsequent year7. The average drop in principle repayment is only 8,606 India 
Rupee which is equivalent to 20% of the principle repayment amount in the 
base year. 
It is worth well to notice that one of the necessary conditions for the increase 
in exemption limit to have any effect on the balance of the tax deductible 
saving account is that the existing balance is below the raised limit. Otherwise, 
the policy a pure income tax cash rebate. For all of Panel A, B and C, we can 
see that, for more than 90% of the loans,  the principle repayment amount 
during 2013:09 to 2014:09 is below the  maximum exemption limit8.  
                                                                 
7
 The mortgage borrowers who reduce principle repayment may also respond to the policy 
change by not reducing as much as they would without the policy change. However, we 
cannot identify such motive. What we can observe is that, for the individuals who increase 
total annual repayment (Panel B) and those who reduce total annual repayment (Panel C), 
the extend of the change in principle repayment is highly asymmetric. 
 
8
 One may also observe that most of  the principle repayment amount during 2013:09 to 
2014:09 is also below the old total exemption limit 100,000 and question that why the 
increased exemption limit should have any effect. It is worth well to notice that, the limit is 
not for principle repayment for the home loan only but it is for all  the items under 80C. 
People may have exposure to health insurance, life insurance and tuition fee etc. which  hit 
the old exemption limit together with the mortgage principle payment. However, we do not 
have the data on the full  saving accounts under 80C.  
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6.2 The average and dynamic response on spending with debit card data 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the average spending response from estimating 
regression equation (1) with the unmatched entire sample. Panel B is the 
estimation on the matched treatment and control groups. We will focus on the 
matched sample from here on. The key explanatory variable is the interaction 
term of the treatment dummy and the post-policy announcement dummy. The 
coefficient captures the change in spending after the policy announcement 
relative to the pre-announcement period of the treatment group relative to the 
control group. The first two columns show that the average total monthly total 
spending (cash withdrawal and P.O.S.) of the treatment group is 25.14 dollars 
less than the control group in the post-treatment period which is about on 
average 5.21% of monthly total spending. Columns (3) and (4) show that the 
average total monthly cash withdrawal of the treatment group is 21.92 dollars 
less than the control group which is about on average 5.58% of monthly total 
cash withdrawal. And the number of cash withdrawal transactions is also, on 
average, reduced by 0.13 times. Columns (6) and (7) show that the average 
total monthly P.O.S. transactions of the treatment group is 3.22 dollars less 
than the control group which is about on average 7.59% of monthly total 
spending via P.O.S. The effect is both statistically and economically 
significant.  
The union budget announced in 2014 was delayed till July from the usual time 
of February due to the general election. Therefore, the union budget applied to 
FY 2014-2015 is the policy made by the new party on power and most likely 
unanticipated by the general India population. Moreover, since the 
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announcement date (July) was later after the effective date (April), we could 
tests on the parallel trend assumption during the period April to July and 
exclude the possibilities that the results are driven by some unobservable fiscal 
year seasonal trend. To further investigate on the dynamic behavior of the 
home loan borrowers relative to its control group, we estimate the dynamic 
model specified in equation (2) and report the results in Table 4.  
We use the month 2014:06 as the base month which is absorbed in the 
constant variable. The variables of interest are the interaction of the treatment 
dummy and the calendar month dummy variable. The coefficients estimation 
in rectangle box refers to the pre-treatment period months’ estimation of the 
relative consumption difference between the treatment and control group. 
Almost all of the coefficients are statistically insignificant and economically 
small. Our sample test does not reject the parallel trend assumption for 
validating the DID methodology. Starting from July till the end of sample 
period which is ten months after the policy announcement, we find 
significantly decline of consumption for the treatment group relative to the 
control group. Mostly, the intensive declination starts from 5th month 
(November) after the policy announcement and the magnitude in declination 
grows since then. Our results are consistent with the findings in the existing 
literature that consumers tend to delay such response to tax deductible saving 
policies till the end of the tax cycle.  
The estimation of the cumulative coefficients based on equation (3) and its 
corresponding confidence interval is reported in Figure 2. Similarly with the 
results on the marginal effect, in the pre-treatment period, the cumulative 
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coefficients are also statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. In the 
post-treatment period, the estimated cumulative coefficients monotonically 
decline over time. On average, by the end of fiscal year 2014-2015 (m9=March 
2015), the treatment group spend 192.54 dollars less than the control group. 
Therefore, on average, the lower bound of the increase in private saving for 
the home loan borrowers is 192.54 dollars for the fiscal year FY2014-2015. 
Since the income tax exemption limit is increased by 833 dollars, our 
estimation shows that, on average for the sub group of the population, one 
dollar increase in the income tax exemption limit is associated with at least 
0.23 dollars increase in private saving.  
6.3 Heterogeneity of spending response across mortgage loan borrowers 
The extant literature documents heterogeneity across population in the 
effectiveness of the tax preferred saving policy on private saving behavior. 
Previous literature has documented that consumers who are more financial 
sophisticated and wealthier are more likely to respond to tax incentive saving 
policies and exhaust the beneficial limit. However, low income people take 
less active actions to such policy changes (Chetty et. al., 2014). We have a rich 
array of account holder demographics which allow us to study the 
heterogeneous response of consumers in greater depth. In the following 
subsections, we estimated regression equation (2) for each subsamples and 
report the cumulative response coefficients and its corresponding confidence 
interval based on equation (3) in Figure 3. To save space, we do not report the 
marginal effect coefficients.  
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6.3.1 Low Income VS High Income 
We classify consumers into four income categories according to the income 
tax slab of the residents below the age of 60 defined in India income tax policy. 
The plots of the cumulative coefficients and their corresponding confidence 
intervals are provided in Figure 3.1. For income slabs 1, 2 we find significant 
decline on the log transformed total spending of the treatment group in 
comparison with the control group but it is not significant for income slab 3 
and 4 which consist of the individuals with the higher annual income. On 
average, by the end of fiscal year 2014-2015 (March 2014), the cumulative 
reduction in consumption of the home loan borrowers compared with their 
control group is 385.58 dollars (122.35%), 423.86 dollars (90.89%) and 
222.74 dollars (40.11%) respectively for income groups 1, 2 and 3. Consumers 
from lower income slab are more financially constrained comparably and 
more likely to reduce consumption to finance the tax deductible saving 
accounts. Different from what existing literature has found, we find the 
individuals with low income do take positive actions in response to the tax 
incentive saving policy change. 
6.3.2 Male VS Female 
We separate the sample based on the individual’s gender. There are more male 
observations in our sample. The plots of the cumulative coefficients and their 
corresponding confidence intervals are provided in Figure 3.2. On average, by 
the end of fiscal year 2014-2015 (March 2014), The cumulative reduction in 
consumption of the home loan borrowers compared with their control group is 
290.20 dollars (74.25%) and 331.71 dollars (58.05%) respectively for the male 
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and the female. With the log transformation of the total spending measure, the 
reduction in consumption for the female is not statistically significant.  
6.3.3 Young VS Old 
We also study the effects over individuals in the different age groups. We cut 
the sample by the age of 40 and 50 to yield more balanced sub-samples in 
terms of sample size. The plots of the cumulative coefficients and their 
corresponding confidence intervals for each sub sample are provided in 
Figure 3.3. For the individuals below the age of 40 and between 40 and 50, 
we find significant decline of total spending of the treatment group in 
comparison to the control group but there is no such effect for the individuals 
beyond the age of 50. The older population is wealthier and less liquidity 
constrained and therefore they are less likely to reduce consumption to 
increase the saving balance in the tax deductible accounts. On average, by the 
end of fiscal year 2014-2015 (March 2014), The cumulative reduction in 
consumption of the home loan borrowers compared with their control group is 
468.60 dollars (117.02%) and 370.29 dollars (75.60%) respectively for the 
individuals below the age of 40 and the individuals between 40 and 50 years 
old. The younger population reduces more in consumption level which could 
be due to the reason that they are less wealthy and thus more liquidity 
constrained.  
6.3.4 Married VS non-Married 
Finally, we divide the sample based on the individual’s marital status. The 
plots of the cumulative coefficients and their corresponding confidence 
intervals for each sub sample are provided in Figure 3.4. On average, by the 
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end of fiscal year 2014-2015 (March 2014), The cumulative reduction in 
consumption of the home loan borrowers compared with their control group is 
263.78 dollars (59.92%) and 326.51 dollars (116.60%) respectively for the 
married individuals and the single. The single people tend to be younger, less 
wealthy and more liquidity constrained. Consistent with what we find in the 
subsample tests over different income levels and ages, the single people tend 
to cut more in consumption to increase saving balance in the tax preferred 
accounts. 
6.4 The average and dynamic response on consumption with debit and 
credit card data 
With another data set consisting of the consumers who have both debit card 
and credit card with the bank, we firstly estimate the average monthly 
spending response on equation (1) and report the results in Table 5. Panel A 
is on the entire sample range from 2014:01 to 2016:02 for the cash & POS  
variable and 2014:04 to 2016:02 for the credit card spending variable.  The 
variable of interest is the interaction of the treatment dummy and the post-
policy announcement dummy. From columns (3) and (4), the average 
reduction in cash withdrawal and POS transactions per month of the treatment 
group relative to the control group is 19.91 Dollars and it is about 10.1% of 
the total monthly cash withdrawal and POS transaction. The finding is similar 
with what we find with the sample of consumers having debit card only. We 
do not find significant drop of spending on credit card as shown in columns (5) 
and (6). It is worth well to notice that, in India, relative to cash withdrawal and 
POS transactions, the monthly credit card spending is small in magnitude and 
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most consumer deals are done in the media of cash. In columns (7) and (8), we 
examine the relative change on the end of month balance of debit card. From 
Panel A, we can see that, there is no significant change of end of month 
balance on debit card of the treatment and control group even though the 
monthly cash withdrawal is significantly reduced. The reduction in cash 
withdrawal is for the purpose of reducing the mortgage loan balance and thus 
does not result in an increase in the current account balance for the home loan 
owners.  
Long term effect of the tax subsided saving policy is of researchers’ primary 
interest. With the debit and credit card data, we able to examine what 
consumers will behave in the next fiscal year. Since in the next fiscal year of 
FY 2015-2016, there is no further change of total income tax exemption limit 
and there is also no category level limit change which makes the treatment and 
control groups in our study have different exposure. Therefore, we have a 
clean setting to examine whether the reduction in consumption of the home 
loan borrowers we identify in FY 2014-2015 will further increase, stay still or 
reverse back. In Panel B of Table 5, we estimate regression equation (1) in 
the entire post-policy announcement period from 2014:07 till 2016:02. The 
Post variable takes the value of 1 for the months after 2015:04 which is the 
starting month of FY2015-2016 and 0 otherwise. We do not find any 
significant increase or decline on the spending level of the treatment group 
relative to the control group for both cash withdrawal, POS transactions and 
credit card spending. The economic magnitude of the interaction variable is 
also small. Hence, in FY 2015-2016, the reduction in consumption of the 
home loan borrowers compared with their control group is sustained. Thus, for 
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the sub group of the population, the positive effect on private saving level 
from the increased tax subsidized saving limit is persistent in the following 
fiscal year. 
Similarly, we also conduct the dynamic studies by estimating regression 
equation (2) but we do not report the results on the marginal effect to save the 
space. Instead, we report the estimated cumulative coefficient and its 
corresponding confidence interval based on equation (3) in Figure 4. In the 
pre-treatment period, the cumulative coefficient is small and statistically 
insignificant from zero. In the post-treatment period, the cumulative 
coefficient is significantly negative and continues to goes down as time goes 
by. By the end of FY 2014-2015 (9 months from the policy announcement), 
the average decline in total spending of the treatment group relative to the 
control group is 155.29 Dollars which is about 54.29% of total amount of one 
month spending. In 20 month time (up to February 2016) , the average decline 
in total spending of the treatment group relative to the control group grows to 
359.21 Dollars which is about 134%  of total amount of one month spending. 
Therefore, with the debit and credit card sample, for a sub group of the 
population, we conclude that the average increase in private saving in response 
to the increase in the limit of the tax subsidized saving is 155.29 Dollars for 
the first year and such positive effect on private saving is persistent in the next 
fiscal year. 
Another advantageous feature of the debit and credit card data is that it can be 
merged with the mortgage loan data as discussed in Section 6.1. With the 
mortgage loan account level data, we are able to identify who are the 
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individuals that increase the principle repayment in response to the policy 
change. To further pin down the channel that the mortgage borrowers indeed 
reduce consumption in order to increase the principle repayment for the 
mortgage loan, we estimated regression equation (1) separately for the home 
loan borrowers who increase principle repayment in FY 2014-2015 and those 
who do not increase and the results are reported in Table 6. Panel A includes 
the mortgage loan borrowers who increase the principle repayment amount by 
more than 10,000 India Rupee from FY 2013-2014 to FY 2014-2015 and their 
matched control groups. For both total spending and cash withdrawal and POS 
transactions, we find significant decline in consumption level of the treatment 
group relative to the control group. However, in Panel B with the mortgage 
loan borrowers who increase the principle repayment amount by less than 
10,000 India Rupee from FY 2013-2014 to FY 2014-2015 and their matched 
control groups, we do not find any significant difference in spending level for 
the treatment group over the control group. Our result indicates that, for those 
who do not respond to the policy by repaying more for the principle part of the 
mortgage loan, the parallel trend of their consumption level and the controlled 
group retains in the post-treatment period. We also report the estimated 
cumulative coefficients and its corresponding confidence interval with the 
dynamic model for the two sub-samples divided by principle repayment 
behavior. Figure 5 reports the results. The graphical pattern of the cumulative 
coefficients further confirms our findings in Table 6.  
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6.5 Saving in the PPF account 
We argue that home mortgage borrowers tend to reduce consumption relative 
to their counterparties in response to the policy change for two reasons. Firstly, 
they have less closely substitutable savings to finance the increased limit of 
the tax subsidized saving accounts. Secondly, people tend to be more 
responsive in reducing negative saving comparing with increasing positive 
saving due to loss aversion behavior bias. However, for the PPF account 
holders and their counterparties, the two arguments do not apply. Therefore, 
we expect to observe no spending difference of the PPF account holders and 
their matched control group in the post-policy announcement period. We 
report the results found for the PPF accounts for two purposes. Firstly, it is a 
placebo test to further validate our methodology. Secondly, we also report our 
findings for the PPF account top-up behavior to provide a more complete 
picture on the impact of the policy change.  
We have 10,000 PPF accounts monthly top-up data and we plot the 
unconditional monthly average for the fiscal year 2013-2014 and fiscal year 
2014-2015 in Figure 6. There is a spike in the month of September of 2014 
after the policy announced in July and the 2014 average monthly top-up is 
constantly higher than 2013 in the months after September. We report the 
summary statistics and the test results in Table 7. Panel A in Table 7 shows 
that the average monthly top-up increases from 35,346 India Rupee in FY 
2013-2014 to 50,632 India Rupee in FY 2014-2015 and the average increase 
in annual total top-up is 15,287 India Rupee. With the same propensity score 
matching method as described in studying home loan borrowers, we obtain a 
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matched control group for the PPF account holders. The summary statistics of 
both the treatment and control groups are reported in Panel B. The treatment 
and control group are statistically indifferent in the dimensions of age, gender, 
marital status, current account balance and saving account balance. Further, 
we estimate the regression equation (1) on the treatment and control group 
with the debit card data from 2014:03 to 2015:04 and the results are given in 
Panel C. The coefficient of the interaction term of PPF account holders cross 
post-policy announcement dummy is statistically indifferent from zero and 
very small in economic magnitude. The results further validate our 
identification strategy.  
7. Robustness 
Firstly, with the debit card data,  we re-estimate equation (1) and shift the 
sample period one fiscal year ahead (2013:04-2014:04) to examine whether 
the treatment and control group share a common trend in consumption level. 
The results are reported in Table A.4 in Appendix . The Post variable is the 
binary variable taking the value of 1 for the period after July 2013 as an 
analogy and 0 otherwise.  For all spending measures, we do not find any 
significant results and the coefficients of the interaction term are small in 
magnitude. Figure A.4 reports the cumulative coefficients and its confidence 
interval. All through the sample period, the cumulative coefficients are 
insignificant different from zero. Our sample tests do not reject the assumption 
that the treatment and control group have the same disposition to 
consume/same in the pre-treatment period. 
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Secondly, to address the concern that mortgage borrowers and non-mortgage 
borrowers are fundamentally different, we exclude the non-mortgage 
borrowers and reconstruct the control group by exploiting the variation in 
mortgage principle payment amount.  With the debit card and credit card 
monthly spending data, we redefine the treatment group to be the mortgage 
loan borrowers with annual principle payment from 100,000 to 150,000 India 
Rupee and the control group to be the mortgage loan borrowers with annual 
principle payment above 150,000 India Rupee.  For the control group, since 
their yearly total principle repayment amount has exceeded the updated limit, 
the policy should have no effect on their repayment behavior. In this setting, 
we only have 654 individuals in the treatment group and 788 individuals in the 
control group. With a small sample, we have limited statistical power. The 
results showing the estimation of equation (1) are laid out in Table A.5 in 
Appendix.  Panel A is for the entire sample and Panel B is for the pre-
treatment period. The sign of the variable of interest is consistent with our 
prediction though not significant due to limited power. 
8. Conclusion 
Few research papers aim to examine whether the tax subsidized saving policy 
can induce more private savings in the developing economy. Our paper fills 
the gap to first address this question by directly testing on whether individuals 
reduce consumption to increase saving in India with the unique panel data of 
consumption financial transactions. We find that the increased income tax 
exemption limit for the mortgage loan repayment induces the home loan 
borrowers to significantly reduce consumption and thus increase private 
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saving. Such increase in saving is persistent in the next fiscal year. Moreover, 
we find that the low income and liquidity constrained individuals also take 
active actions in saving more in response to the policy. 
The literature has the general perception that the tax subsidy type of policy in 
inducing more private saving is ineffective and the default option targeting the 
passive savers is more effective. I would like to raise the attention that this 
may not be true for all kinds of savings or the developing economy.  
Our study is also limited in several dimensions. Firstly, our estimation is for 
two years short term effect. Secondly, our estimation on the increase of private 
saving is a lower bound. Thirdly, the estimation of the effect is for a sub group 
of the population who has mortgage loans. We do not have a clean setting to 
examine whether the rest of the population have increased private saving in 
response to the tax subsidized saving account policy change. Fourthly, our 
study cannot address the question on whether the increase in tax subsidy on 
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A.1 India Income Tax Policy 
The basic Indian income tax policy structure related to our paper is 
summarized in Table A.1. We include one fiscal year before (FY 2013-2014) 
and one fiscal year after (FY 2015-2016) the policy announcement year of FY 
2014-2015. The India income tax rate and slabs are different for residents in 
different age groups. The tax rates are different for different income slabs. For 
example, if an individual below 60 has the total net income of 300,000 India 
Rupee in FY 2014-2015, the part below 250,000 does not need to pay income 
tax. The part above 250,000 which is 50,000 in this example needs to pay 
50,000*10% =5,000 India Rupee as the income tax. The total income tax is 
thus 5,000 for this individual in FY2014-2015. The net income is obtained by 
deducting the exemptible amount from the total income. Following the above 
example, if 300,000 India Rupee is the total income and this individual has 
50,000 India Rupee exemptible items, the net income is 250,000 India Rupee 
and he does not need to pay any income tax. The total exemption limit is also 
different for junior and senior residents. For the residents below the age of 80, 
the total income exemption limit is raised by 50,000 India Rupee from FY 
2013-2014 to FY 2014-2015and this limit does not change in FY 2015-2016.  
A.2 India Income Tax Exemption Policy (section 80C)  
The following information is retrieved from 
https://www.bankbazaar.com/tax/deductions-under-80c.html. 
Indian Income Tax deduction - Section 80C  
Section 80C of Indian Income Tax Act is the most popular because it is 
directly related to tax deductions for your monthly savings or life insurance. 
The following is a list of important ways in which a taxpayer can get benefit 
of section 80C of Indian Income Tax Act. 
1. Provident Fund (PF): Any contributions to Provident Fund, Voluntary 
provident Fund (VPF) or savings made in Public Provident Fund (PPF 
Account) are eligible for income tax deduction under section 80C of Indian 
Income Tax Act. 
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2. Life Insurance Premiums : Any Life Insurance premiums (for one or more 
insurance policies) paid by you for yourself, your spouse or your children is 
eligible under income tax deduction under section 80C of Indian Income Tax 
Act. 
3. ELSS Equity Linked Saving Schemes : Any investment made in certain 
Mutual Funds called equity linked saving schemes qualifies for section 80C 
deduction. Please note that not all mutual fund investments are eligible for this 
deduction. Some examples of ELSS funds are: SBI Magnum Tax Gain, HDFC 
Tax Saver, HDFC Long term advantage, etc. 
4. ULIP (Unit Linked Insurance Plan): Investments made in certain ULIPs of 
Unit Trust of India and LIC of India are eligible for 80C deduction.  
5. Bank Fixed deposits or Term deposits of >5 years : According to a relatively 
new provision amount saved in fixed deposits of term at least five years is 
eligible for income tax deduction under section 80C of Indian Income Tax Act.  
6. Principal part of EMI on Housing Loan: If you are paying EMI on a 
housing loan, note that the EMI (equated monthly installments) consists of two 
parts - principal part and interest part. The principal part of the EMI on your 
housing loan is eligible for income tax deduction under section 80C. Note that 
the interest part is also eligible for tax deduction, however not under section 
80C but section 24.  
7. Tuition Fees: Amount paid as tuition fee for the education of two children of 
the assesse is eligible for deduction under section 80C of Indian Income Tax 
Act. 
8. Other 80C deductions: Amount saved in National Saving Certificate (NSC), 
Infrastructure Bonds or Infra Bonds, amount paid as stamp duty and 
registration charges while buying a new home are eligib le for income tax 





A.3 India Income Tax Exemption Policy (Public provident Fund) 
 
A minimum yearly deposit of Rs. 500 is required to open and maintain a PPF 
account, and a maximum deposit of Rs.1.5 lakhs (w.e.f August 2014) can be 
made in a PPF account in any given financial year. The subscriber should not 
deposit more than Rs.1.50 lac per annum as the excess amount will neither 
earn any interest nor will be eligible for rebate under Income Tax Act. The 
amount can be deposited in lump sum or in a maximum of 12 installments per 
year. 
 
The government of India decides the rate of interest for PPF account. The 
current interest rate effective from 1 April 2013 is 8.70% Per 
Annum (compounded annually) which was revised from 8.80% effective from 
1 April 2012. Interest will be paid on 31 March every year. Interest is 
calculated on the lowest balance between the close of the fifth day and the last 
day of every month. 
 
In a generalized view, if an individual deposits an amount of 1 lakh every year 
for 15 years without any exception, then he would receive a total sum of more 
than 30 lakh. This reflects the huge amount of benefit applicable on PPF 
account, for a total investment of 15 lakh (1 lakh every year * 15 years) 
interest received is more than 16 lakh, which is also in fact non-taxable. 
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Figure 1 Plots of the Average Monthly Spending 
The following figures provide the unconditional monthly average spending for the 
sample both before and after the propensity score matching. Each spending measure 
is divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in 
US dollars. The dotted vertical lines indicate the starting of the fiscal year 2014-2015, 











 Figure 2 Estimated Spending Response Dynamics with Debit Card Data 
The figures plots the entire paths of cumulative coefficients     s=(-3)-(-1) & 1-10 
with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of dollar value of cash 
withdrawal, total dollar value of spending, number of cash withdrawal transactions 
and number of P.O.S. transactions as estimated from equation (3). The marginal 
effect coefficients are reported in Table 4. The y axis is the dollar value response and 
the x axis indicates the calendar months. The vertical blue line indicates m0 (June 
2014) which separates the pre and post treatment periods. The horizontal dotted line 














 Figure 3 Heterogeneity in Spending Response across Consumers 
The figures plots the entire paths of cumulative coefficients     s=(-3)-(-1) & 1-10 
with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of total dollar value of 
spending estimated from equation (3). The dependent variable is log transformed and 
thus the y axis indicates approximated percentage change. The vertical blue line 
indicates m0 (June 2014) which separates the pre and post treatment periods. Panel A 
compares the consumers with different annual income and we cut the samples same 
as the income slab defined in the India income tax policy. Panel B compares the male 
and female consumers. Panel C compares the consumers in different age groups and 
the cut off is chosen as 40 and 50 to yield a more balanced sample size among three 
sub-samples. Panel D compares the consumers in different marital status (single VS 
married).  
Panel A: by Income Slabs 
Income slab 1 includes with the individuals of annual income from 0 to 250,000 India 
Rupee. Income slab 2 includes with the individuals of annual income from 250,001 to 
500,000 India Rupee. Income slab 1 includes with the individuals of annual income 
from 500,001 to 1,000,000 India Rupee. Income slab 1 includes with the individuals 








Panel B: by Gender 
 
Panel C: by Age Groups 
 
 






Figure 4 Dynamic Spending on Debit & Credit Card Data 
The figures plots the entire paths of cumulative coefficients     s=(-2)-(-1) & 1-20 
with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of total dollar value of 
spending (Panel A) and log of total dollar of spending (Panel B) as estimated from 
equation (3). For Panel A, the total dollar value of spending is divided by 60 (1US 
dollar=60 India Rupee at 2014:07) and should be taken as in US dollar. The y axis is 
the dollar value response and the x axis indicates the calendar months. For Panel B, 
the y axis is the percentage change. The vertical blue line indicates m0 (June 2014) 
which separates the pre and post treatment periods. The vertical brown line separates 
the fiscal year 2014-2015 and the fiscal year 2015-2016. 



















Figure 5 Dynamic Spending Response with Subsamples Divided by Increase 
in Home Loan Principle Repayment 
The figures plots the entire paths of cumulative coefficients     s=(-5)-(-1) & 1-20 
with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of total dollar value of 
spending (Panel A.1 & B.1) and log of total dollar of spending (Panel A.2 & B.2) as 
estimated from equation (3).  Panel A reports the results on the subsamples with the 
home mortgage borrowers who increase the principle repayment amount from 
FY2013-FY2014 to FY2014-FY2015 by more than 10,000 India Rupee and their 
matched control group. The definition of Δp is given in Table 2. Panel B reports the 
results on the subsamples with the home mortgage borrowers who do not increase the 
principle repayment amount from FY2013-FY2014 to FY2014-FY2015 by more than 
10,000 India Rupee and their matched control group. For Panel A.1 & B.1, the total 
dollar value of spending is divided by 60 (1US dollar=60 India Rupee at 2014:07) 
and should be taken as in US dollar. The y axis is the dollar value response and the x 
axis indicates the calendar months. For Panel A.2 & B.2, the y axis is the percentage 
change. The vertical blue line indicates m0 (June 2014) which separates the pre and 
post treatment periods. The vertical brown line separates the fiscal year 2014-2015 
and the fiscal year 2015-2016. 
Panel A.1                                                     Panel A.2 
 







Figure 6 Average Monthly PPF Top-up 
The following figure provides the unconditional monthly average top-up for all 
10,000 PPF accounts in our sample. The top-up amount is divided by 60 (1 US dollar 
=60 India Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars. The red vertical 
lines indicate the calendar month of July. The blue line is for the fiscal year 2013-



















Figure A.4 Placebo Tests on Dynamics Spending Response with Debit Card 
Data 
The figures plots the entire paths of cumulative coefficients     s=(-2)-(-1) & 1-10 
with their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of total dollar value of 
spending and log of total dollar value of spending as estimated from equation (3). The 
sample period is 2013:04 to 2014:04 which one fiscal year before the policy affected 
fiscal year. The y axis is the dollar value response and the x axis indicates the 
calendar months. The vertical blue line indicates m0 (June 201) which separates the 




















Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The following table reports the summary statistics of the three data sets. Panel A is 
the summary statistics of the mortgage loan data. The data are reported in India 
Rupee. Panel B is the summary statistics of treatment and control sample from debit 
card data. The treatment group consists of individuals who have home loan with the 
bank. The control group consists of those with no home loan. Both of the 
demographics (age, gender, marital status, annual income) and accounts information 
are reported. For the current account balance and saving account balance, we only 
have the data at the end of Feb 2015 and they are reported in India Rupee. For the 
monthly spending data, we report the pre-treatment period (2014:03-201406) and 
post-treatment period (2014:07-2015:04) statistics separately. Monthly cash 
withdrawal is computed by adding monthly cash withdrawal and cash withdrawal 
from ATM over debit card account for each individual. Monthly # ATM debit 
transactions measures the total number of transactions per month from ATM cash 
withdrawal. Monthly P.O.S. transaction is computed by adding monthly spending via 
point of sale machine for each individual. Monthly # P.O.S. transactions measures the 
total number of transactions per month through point of sale machine. All the 
spending data are reported in India Rupee. 1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014. 
Diff reports the pair wise t-tests mean difference of the treatment group and control 
group and estimates and ***, **,* denote statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  Panel C reports the summary statistics of the treatment and control 
sample from debit and credit card data. The treatment group consists of individuals 
with merged home mortgage account (accounts reported in Panel A) and the control 
group consists of the individuals with no merged home mortgage account. Both of the 
demographics (age, gender, marital status, annual income) and accounts information 
are reported. For the current account balance data, we report it in the pre-treatment 
period 2014:01-2014:06. Monthly cash withdrawal & P.O.S. is the total amount of 
India Rupee withdrew in cash and spent via point of sale machine for each month for 
each individual. The sample range is 2014:01-2016:02 and we report the statistics for 
the pre-treatment period 2014:01-2014:06 and the post-treatment period 2014:07-
2016:02 separately. Monthly credit card spending is the total amount of India Rupee 
spent via credit card monthly for each individual. For this variable, the sample period 
is 2014:04-2016:02.  
 
Panel A: Mortgage Loan Data
N Mean p10 p50 p90 Std.
approved credit limit 500,350 770,943 268,000 600,000 1,500,000 569,962
loan term (in months) 500,350 188 120 180 240 44
repayment starting year 500,350 2,009 2,005 2,009 2,012 2.9
value of primary security 500,019 1,317,695 270,000 986,691 2546000 1.20E+07
interest rate 500,350 10 7.8 11 13 1.9
loan borrower (age) 500,107 54 38 50 65 19














Panel B: Debit Card Data
N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
diff
age 12,670 45 9 72,094 52 12 7.198***
gender (male=1, female=0) 12,670 0.87 0.34 72,094 0.80 0.4 -0.068***
marrital status (married=1,single=0) 12,670 0.76 0.43 72,094 0.70 0.46 -0.059***
annual income 12,670 620,556 570,602 72,094 1,482,365 2.20E+08 861,809
current account balance (2015:02) 8,036 106,653 2,068,619 51,873 223,555 771,712 116,902***
saving account balance  (2015:02) 12,078 104,989 1,704,130 38,138 572,425 1,496,357 467,436***
monthly cash withdrawal (2014:03-2014:06) 50,680 25,733 32,365 288,376 23,389 29,643  -2,344***
monthly cash withdrawal (2014:07-2015:04) 126,700 24,390 30,132 720,940 23,590 29,872 -800***
monthly #ATM debit transactions (2014:03-2014:06) 50,680 4.9 4.6 288,376 4 4.1 -0.871***
monthly #ATM debit transactions (2014:07-2015:04) 126,700 4.5 4.2 720,940 3.8 4.0 -0.665***
monthly  P.O.S. transaction (2014:03-2014:06) 50,680 2,653 8,107 288,376 2,711 8,217 57.56
monthly  P.O.S. transaction (2014:07-2015:04) 126,700 2,910 8,225 720,940 3,190 9,023 280.732***
monthly #P.O.S.transactions (2014:03-2014:06) 50,680 1.1 2.5 288,376 1.1 2.5  -0.058***
monthly #P.O.S.transactions (2014:07-2015:04) 126,700 1.2 2.6 720,940 1.2 2.6 -0.018***
N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
diff
age 12,515 45 9 12,515 45 9.9 -0.008
gender (male=1, female=0) 12,515 0.87 0.34 12,515 0.87 0.34 0.004
marrital status (married=1,single=0) 12,515 0.75 0.43 12,515 0.75 0.43 -0.002
annual income 12,515 618,618 571,797 12,515 618,645 702,101 26.56
current account balance (2015:02) 7,904 107,560 2,085,661 7,904 194,003 509,108 86,443***
saving account balance  (2015:02) 11,925 105,934 1,714,973 6,983 377,687 895,395 271,753***
monthly cash withdrawal (2014:03-2014:06) 50,060 25,794 32,440 50,060 26,185 30,676 390.54**
monthly cash withdrawal (2014:07-2015:04) 125,150 24,447 30,199 125,150 26,152 30,582 1705.58***
monthly #ATM debit transactions (2014:03-2014:06) 50,060 4.9 4.6 50,060 4.6 4.3 -0.253***
monthly #ATM debit transactions (2014:07-2015:04) 125,150 4.4 4.2 125,150 4.3 4.1 -0.122***
monthly  P.O.S. transaction (2014:03-2014:06) 50,060 2,647 8,076 50,060 2,947 8,450 300***
monthly  P.O.S. transaction (2014:07-2015:04) 125,150 2,915 8,244 125,150 3,408 9,173 493.18***
monthly #P.O.S. transactions (2014:03-2014:06) 50,060 1.1 2.5 50,060 1.2 2.8 0.112***
monthly #P.O.S. transactions (2014:07-2015:04) 125,150 1.2 2.6 125,150 1.4 2.9 0.142***
treatment group control group
matched treatment group matched control group
Panel C: Debit Card and Credit Card Data
diff
N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
age 12,596 46 9.4 12,596 46 9.5 0.005
gender 12,596 0.83 0.37 12,596 0.83 0.38 -0.003
marrital status (married=1,single=0) 12,596 0.13 0.33 12,596 0.12 0.33 -0.001
current account balance (2014:01-2014:06) 75,489 86,939 203,206 74,871 72,606 246,949 -14,333***
monthly cash withdrawal & P.O.S.  (2014:01-2014:06) 75,576 27,465 37,296 75,576 22,918 33,607 -4,547***
monthly cash withdrawal & P.O.S.  (2014:07-2016:02) 226,728 28,478 36,039 226,728 25,060 36,392 -3,417***
monthly credit card spending (2014:04-2014:06) 75,576 1,720 7,096 75,576 1,357 6,362 -363***
monthly credit card spending  (2014:07-2016:02) 226,728 4,116 11,090 226,728 3,337 10,039  -778***
matched treatment group matched control group
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Table 2 Change of the Annual Mortgage Loan Principle Repayment 
This reports the change of the annual mortgage loan principle repayment over all 
mortgage accounts in the sample. For each mortgage loan account in our sample, we 
have three snap shot of the loan status at 2013:09, 2014:09 and 2015:09. For each 
time point, we have its principle account balance and total interest payment up to date. 
By taking the difference of the principle account balance and total interest payment 
up to date between 2014:09 and 201309, we obtain the annual principle repayment 
amount (p1) and annual interest payment amount (i1). The total annual mortgage loan 
repayment is therefore p1+i1=t1. Similarly, we could obtain p2, i2 and t2 from 2014:09 
to 2015:09. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the accounts with |      |  
  which means the total annual repayment is the same from FY2013-2014 to FY 
2014-2015. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the accounts with         
which means the total annual repayment is increased from FY2013-2014 to FY 2014-
2015. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the accounts with         which 
means the total annual repayment is reduced from FY2013-2014 to FY 2014-2015. 










Panel A: 58.95% home loan borrowers do not  increase annual total repayment 
N mean p10 p50 p90 Std.
principle payment 1 (p1: 2013:09-2014:09) 294,943 43,073 14,196 31,647 83,757 38,779
principle payment 2 (p2: 2014:09-2015:09) 294,943 48,257 15,766 35,563 94,052 43,519
change of principle payment (Δp: p2-p1) 294,943 5,189 1,250 4,029 11,217 6,175
% change of principle payment (Δp/p1) 294,943 12% 6% 13% 18% 14%
Panel B: 21.54% home loan borrowers increase annual total repayment
N mean p10 p50 p90 sd
principle payment 1 (p1: 2013:09-2014:09) 107,766 39,927 13,470 29,820 77,271 33,157
principle payment 2 (p2: 2014:09-2015:09) 107,766 56,350 21,636 46,031 102,202 39,134
change of principle payment (Δp: p2-p1) 107,766 16,425 4,560 13,284 35,129 12,042
% change of principle payment (Δp/p1) 107,766 55% 16% 39% 120% 54%
Panel C: 19.51% home loan borrowers reduce annual total repayment
N mean p10 p50 p90 sd
principle payment 1 (p1: 2013:09-2014:09) 97,641 49,326 15,628 36,639 94,858 45,419
principle payment 2 (p2: 2014:09-2015:09) 97,641 40,682 9,823 28,846 82,310 43,778
change of principle payment (Δp: p2-p1) 97,641 -8,606 -27,100 -4,488 1,814 12,220
% change of principle payment (Δp/p1) 97,641 -20% -57% -13% 5% 24%
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Table 3 Average Spending Response with Debit Card Data 
The table shows the average spending response of the treatment group relative to the 
control group with the sample both before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) the 
propensity score matching from 2014:03 to 2015:04. The regression specification is 
given in equation (1).  Each column represents the estimation for its corresponding 
dependent variable indicated in the first row. The dependent variable is divided by 60 
(1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars.  
HLB is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual has a home 
mortgage loan and 0 otherwise. Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 for 
the months after 2014 July (Policy Announcement Date) and 0 otherwise. $ Total 
Spending is the summation of $ cash and $ POS whose definitions are given in Table 
1. For all the regressions, individual fixed effects and year-month fixed effects are 
imposed. The standard error is clustered at individual level. The standard error are 
reported in parentheses under the coefficients estimates and ***, **,* denote 










Panel A: Entire Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash ln($ cash) # cash withdrawal $ POS ln($ POS) # POS
HLB*Post -29.46*** -0.0993*** -25.74*** -0.0796*** -0.215*** -3.719*** -0.119*** -0.0424***
(3.579) (0.0202) (3.379) (0.0211) (0.0234) (0.801) (0.0223) (0.0140)
constant 403.1*** 8.227*** 363.7*** 7.837*** 3.993*** 39.34*** 2.630*** 1.034***
(1.491) (0.0100) (1.406) (0.0105) (0.00983) (0.391) (0.0104) (0.00591)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 1,186,696 1,186,696 1,186,696 1,186,696 1,175,951 1,186,696 1,186,696 1,175,951
R sqaured 0.375 0.447 0.379 0.481 0.589 0.275 0.406 0.605
Panel B: Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash ln($ cash) # cash withdrawal $ POS ln($ POS) # POS
HLB*Post -25.14*** -0.0521** -21.92*** -0.0558** -0.132*** -3.218*** -0.0759** -0.0298
(4.525) (0.0265) (4.263) (0.0275) (0.0303) (1.075) (0.0296) (0.0191)
constant 443.4*** 8.588*** 402.8*** 8.265*** 4.569*** 40.60*** 2.760*** 1.129***
(2.903) (0.0169) (2.752) (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.697) (0.0192) (0.0113)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420





Table 4 Dynamic Monthly Spending Response with Debit Card 
The table reports the result of the estimation of the distributed lag model as in 
equation (2) with the propensity score matched sample in the period of 2014:03-
2015:04. The regression specification is given in equation (2). Each column 
represents the estimation for its corresponding dependent variable indicated in the 
first row. The dependent variable is divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at 
July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars. The constant absorbs the month 
2014:06 (m0) which is one month before the policy announcement month of 2014:07. 
Pre m-i is a binary variable that is equal to one for the i
th
 month before m0 . Post mi is 
a binary variable that is equal to one for the i
th
 month after m0. HLB is the dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the individual has a home mortgage loan and 0 
otherwise. For all the regressions, individual fixed effects and year-month fixed 
effects are imposed. The standard error is clustered at individual level. The standard 
errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficients estimates and ***, **,* 











$ cash ln($ cash)
# cash 
withdrawal
$ POS ln($ POS) # POS
HLB Χ Pre m-3 5.372 0.0397 7.370 0.0492 0.0222 -1.997 -0.0277 -0.00400
(8.179) (0.0290) (7.692) (0.0304) (0.0532) (2.188) (0.0294) (0.00760)
HLB Χ Pre m-2 0.702 -0.0127 3.385 -0.0155 -0.0340 -2.684 -0.0405 -0.0145*
(8.105) (0.0284) (7.548) (0.0294) (0.0519) (2.319) (0.0300) (0.00749)
HLB Χ Pre m-1 7.057 0.0600** 9.953 0.0469* 0.0930* -2.896 -0.000951 -0.00301
(7.779) (0.0265) (7.281) (0.0278) (0.0498) (2.293) (0.0296) (0.00715)
HLB Χ Post m1 -16.77** -0.0187 -10.45 -0.00670 -0.0384 -6.318*** -0.0528* -0.00714
(7.573) (0.0264) (7.066) (0.0278) (0.0490) (2.263) (0.0293) (0.00718)
HLB Χ Post m2 1.002 0.00895 5.004 0.0111 -0.00352 -4.002* -0.0428 -0.00565
(7.851) (0.0276) (7.318) (0.0288) (0.0513) (2.331) (0.0309) (0.00758)
HLB Χ Post m3 -4.315 0.0216 -0.154 0.0143 -0.0158 -4.161* -0.0549* -0.0160**
(8.226) (0.0290) (7.687) (0.0303) (0.0532) (2.292) (0.0312) (0.00778)
HLB Χ Post m4 -5.606 0.0372 -3.311 0.0242 0.0203 -2.295 -0.00601 0.00405
(8.359) (0.0292) (7.701) (0.0305) (0.0537) (2.578) (0.0329) (0.00814)
HLB Χ Post m5 -21.15** -0.0207 -15.27** -0.00520 -0.125** -5.880** -0.0965*** -0.0216***
(8.314) (0.0297) (7.688) (0.0311) (0.0531) (2.464) (0.0315) (0.00790)
HLB Χ Post m6 -34.39*** -0.0639** -28.98*** -0.0668** -0.137** -5.405** -0.0669** -0.0211**
(8.402) (0.0304) (7.837) (0.0316) (0.0544) (2.349) (0.0320) (0.00821)
HLB Χ Post m7 -23.67*** -0.0275 -19.35** -0.0320 -0.143*** -4.320* -0.0483 -0.0127
(8.727) (0.0309) (8.131) (0.0323) (0.0555) (2.410) (0.0320) (0.00828)
HLB Χ Post m8 -44.21*** -0.0570* -37.36*** -0.0543 -0.266*** -6.855*** -0.105*** -0.0181**
(8.801) (0.0321) (8.210) (0.0333) (0.0557) (2.347) (0.0315) (0.00814)
HLB Χ Post m9 -43.42*** -0.0947*** -37.05*** -0.101*** -0.265*** -6.377*** -0.0964*** -0.0161*
(8.792) (0.0317) (8.267) (0.0331) (0.0567) (2.360) (0.0325) (0.00847)
HLB Χ Post m10 -25.99*** -0.0507 -20.48** -0.0583* -0.140** -5.512** -0.0746** -0.0177**
(8.977) (0.0317) (8.449) (0.0330) (0.0570) (2.386) (0.0321) (0.00854)
constant 474.5*** 5.144*** 426.8*** 4.914*** 4.685*** 47.73*** 1.487*** 0.296***
(2.852) (0.0101) (2.660) (0.0105) (0.0185) (0.812) (0.0106) (0.00265)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420 350,420
R sqaured 0.385 0.489 0.386 0.508 0.584 0.290 0.422 0.576
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Table 5 Average Spending Response with Debit & Credit Card Data 
The table shows the average spending response of the treatment group relative to the 
control group with propensity score matching on the consumers with both debit card 
and credit card data. The regression specification is given in equation (1). Each 
column represents the estimation for its corresponding dependent variable indicated 
in the first row. The dependent variable is divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India 
Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars. In Panel A, for the columns 
cash&POS is for the sample period from 2014:01 to 2016:02 and for columns Total 
Spending and credit card spending, the sample period is from 2014:04 to 2016:02.  
Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 for the months after 2014 July (Policy 
Announcement Date) and 0 otherwise.  In Panel B, the sample period is for the post-
treatment period from 2014:07 to 2016:02. Post is the binary variable taking the value 
of 1 for the months after 2015 April which is the starting month of the fiscal year 
2015-2016 and 0 otherwise. HLB is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
individual has a home mortgage loan and 0 otherwise. $ Total Spending is the 
summation of $ cash&POS and $ credit card spending whose definitions are given in 
Table 1. $ End of Month Balance is the dollar value of the balance on the debit card at 
the end of each calendar month for each individual. For all the regressions, individual 
fixed effects and year-month fixed effects are imposed. The standard error is 
clustered at individual level. The standard error are reported in parentheses under the 






Panel A: Matched Sample (2014:01/2014:04-2016:02)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$ Total Spending
ln ($ Total 
Spending)
$ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
$ credit card 
spending
ln ($ credit card 
spending)
$ End of Month 
Balance
ln ($ End of 
Month Balance)
HLB*Post -21.27*** -0.0892*** -19.91*** -0.101*** 0.739 -0.0350* 33.25 0.0210
(post if after 2014:07) (5.769) (0.0200) (4.318) (0.0177) (1.329) (0.0185) (36.33) (0.0140)
constant 476.7*** 4.812*** 399.1*** 4.576*** 47.36*** 1.659*** 1,293*** 5.584***
(3.776) (0.0123) (3.038) (0.0119) (0.942) (0.0117) (17.82) (0.00894)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 579,416 579,416 654,992 654,992 579,416 579,416 653,846 653,846
R sqaured 0.338 0.429 0.358 0.447 0.203 0.280 0.552 0.626
Panel B: Matched Sample (2014:07-2016:02)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$ Total Spending
ln ($ Total 
Spending)
$ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
$ credit card 
spending
ln($ credit card 
spending)
$ End of Month 
Balance
ln ($ End of 
Month Balance)
HLB*Post -1.285 -0.0124 -2.108 -0.0151 0.823 0.0171 29.52 0.0300**
(post if after 2015:04) (4.863) (0.0171) (4.236) (0.0166) (1.184) (0.0168) (33.47) (0.0131)
constant 460.2*** 4.857*** 407.7*** 4.696*** 52.57*** 1.863*** 1,390*** 5.642***
(3.495) (0.0121) (3.084) (0.0120) (0.880) (0.0120) (17.00) (0.00875)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 503,840 503,840 503,840 503,840 503,840 503,840 503,486 503,486





Table 6 Average Spending Response with Subsamples Divided by Increase in 
Home Loan Principle Repayment 
The table shows the average spending response of the treatment group relative to the 
control group with propensity score matching on the consumers with both debit card 
and credit card data. The regression specification is given in equation (1). Each 
column represents the estimation for its corresponding dependent variable indicated 
in the first row. The dependent variable is divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India 
Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars. For the columns 
cash&POS is for the sample period from 2014:01 to 2016:02 and for columns Total 
Spending, the sample period is from 2014:04 to 2016:02.  Post is the binary variable 
taking the value of 1 for the months after 2014 July (Policy Announcement Date) and 
0 otherwise.  HLB is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual has a 
home mortgage loan and 0 otherwise. $ Total Spending is the summation of 
$ cash&POS and $ credit card spending whose definitions are given in Table 1. 
Panel A reports the results on the subsamples with the home mortgage borrowers 
who increase the principle repayment amount from FY2013-FY2014 to FY2014-
FY2015 by more than 10,000 India Rupee and their matched control group. The 
definition of Δp is given in Table 2. Panel B reports the results on the subsamples 
with the home mortgage borrowers who do not increase the principle repayment 
amount from FY2013-FY2014 to FY2014-FY2015 by more than 10,000 India Rupee 
and their matched control group. For all the regressions, individua l fixed effects and 
year-month fixed effects are imposed. The standard error is clustered at individual 
level. The standard error are reported in parentheses under the coefficients estimates 




Panel A: Δp>=10K India Rupee
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
HLB*Post -39.74*** -0.126*** -40.34*** -0.147***
(7.890) (0.0267) (6.002) (0.0238)
constant 491.3*** 4.784*** 410.6*** 4.554***
(5.303) (0.0164) (4.146) (0.0158)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 338,836 338,836 383,032 383,032
R sqaured 0.338 0.423 0.358 0.439
Panel B: Δp<10K India Rupee
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
HLB*Post 4.743 -0.0372 8.871 -0.0369
(8.329) (0.0299) (6.030) (0.0266)
constant 456.0*** 4.850*** 382.8*** 4.607***
(5.184) (0.0185) (4.405) (0.0178)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 240,580 240,580 271,960 271,960





Table 7 PPF Accounts and Account Holders’ Monthly Spending 
The following table reports the summary statistics and average monthly spending 
response of PPF account holders. The sample period is from 2013:04 to 2015:03. 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of average monthly top-up in the PPF account 
for 10,000 individuals in our sample. Change of annual top-up is the difference 
between the total annual top-up in FY 2013-2014 and the total annual top-up in FY 
214-2015. Panel B reports the demographics and account information of the PPF 
account holders and their propensity score matched control group. For the current 
account balance and saving account balance, we only have the data at 2015:02. The 
data are reported in India Rupee. Panel C reports the average spending response of 
the PPF account holders relative to their matched control group. $ Total Spending is 
the summation of $ cash&POS and $ credit card spending whose definitions are 
given in Table 1. Each column represents the estimation for its corresponding 
dependent variable indicated in the first row. The dependent variable is divided by 60 
(1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in US dollars. 
PPF is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual has a PPF account 
with the bank and 0 otherwise. Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 for the 
months after 2014 July (Policy Announcement Date) and 0 otherwise.  For all the 
regressions, individual fixed effects and year-month fixed effects are imposed. The 
standard error is clustered at individual level. The standard error are reported in 
parentheses under the coefficients estimates and ***, **,* denote statistical 





Panel A : Summary Statistics
N Mean p10 p50 p90 sd
average monthly top-up (FY2013-2014) 120,000 35,346 0 15,000 100,000 39,259
average monthly top-up (FY2014-2015) 120,000 50,632 500 25,000 150,000 55,234
change of annual top-up 10,000 15,287 -18,000 3,000 51,000 39,960
Panel B: Matched Sample
N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
diff
age 6,155 52 13 6,155 52 13 - 0.010
gender (male=1, female=0) 6,155 0.72 0.45 6,155 0.72 0.45 0.0004
marrital status (married=1,single=0) 6,155 0.66 0.47 6,155 0.66 0.47 -0.001
current account balance (2015:02) 6,155 243,189 2,498,573 6,155 254,936 1,114,744 11,747
saving account balance  (2015:02) 2,865 841,814 4,137,913 2,975 809,049 2,841,344 -32,765
Panel C: Diff-in-Diff Tests
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash ln($ cash) $ POS ln($ POS)
PPF*Post -2.344 0.0274 -2.118 -0.0263 -0.226 0.0640
(5.837) (0.0478) (5.296) (0.0478) (1.716) (0.0433)
constant 314.3*** 6.824*** 273.0*** 6.195*** 41.29*** 2.552***
(3.754) (0.0305) (3.480) (0.0312) (1.095) (0.0277)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 172,340 172,340 172,340 172,340 172,340 172,340
R sqaured 0.419 0.474 0.422 0.519 0.306 0.394
individual, year-month
matched control groupmatched treatment group
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income level Tax Rate
exemption 





<=Rs. 200,000 Nil <=Rs. 250,000 Nil
Rs. 200,001-Rs.500,000 10% Rs. 250,001-Rs.500,000 10%
Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20% Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20%
>=1,000,001 30% >=1,000,001 30%
Age 60-80
income level Tax Rate
exemption 





<=Rs. 250,000 Nil <=Rs. 300,000 Nil
Rs. 250,001-Rs.500,000 10% Rs. 300,001-Rs.500,000 10%
Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20% Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20%
>=1,000,001 30% >=1,000,001 30%
Age >80
income level Tax Rate
exemption 





<=Rs. 500,000  Nil <=Rs. 500,000  Nil
Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20% Rs. 500,001-Rs.1,000,000 20%










Table A.4 Placebo Tests on Average Spending Response with Debit Card Data 
The table shows the average spending response of the treatment group relative to the 
control group with the propensity score matching from 2013:04 to 2014:04. The 
sample range is one fiscal year before the policy affected fiscal year. The regression 
specification is given in equation (1).  Each column represents the estimation for its 
corresponding dependent variable indicated in the first row. The dependent variable is 
divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014) and should be taken as in 
US dollars.  HLB is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual has a 
home mortgage loan and 0 otherwise. Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 
for the months after 2013 July (July is the policy announcement month in 2014) and 0 
otherwise. $ Total Spending is the summation of $ cash and $ POS whose definitions 
are given in Table 1. For all the regressions, individual fixed effects and year-month 
fixed effects are imposed. The standard error is clustered at individual level. The 
standard error are reported in parentheses under the coefficients estimates and ***, 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash ln($ cash) # cash withdrawal $ POS ln($ POS) # POS
HLB*Post -4.066 -0.0319* -4.150 -0.0246 -0.0116 0.0838 0.000512 -0.0223
(4.688) (0.0177) (4.461) (0.0180) (0.0315) (1.063) (0.0150) (0.0175)
constant 456.3*** 4.940*** 416.8*** 4.771*** 4.541*** 39.49*** 1.195*** 0.900***
(2.916) (0.0105) (2.763) (0.0108) (0.0191) (0.731) (0.00985) (0.00998)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 325,390 325,390 325,390 325,390 325,390 325,390 325,390 325,390




Table A.5 Average Response in Spending for Home Loan Borrwoers Only 
The table shows the average spending response of the treatment group relative to the 
control group with the debit and credit card data. The treatment group is defined to be 
the mortgage loan borrowers with annual principle payment (FY2013-2014) from 
100,000 to 150,000 India Rupee and the control group to be the mortgage loan 
borrowers with annual principle payment (FY2013-2014) above 150,000 India Rupee. 
The regression specification is given in equation (1).  Each column represents the 
estimation for its corresponding dependent variable indicated in the first row. The 
dependent variable is divided by 60 (1 US dollar =60 India Rupee at July 2014) and 
should be taken as in US dollars.  HLB is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the individual has a home mortgage loan and 0 otherwise. Panel A is for the entire 
sample period from 2014:01 to 2016:02 and Post is the binary variable taking the 
value of 1 for the months after 2014 July and 0 otherwise. Panel B is for the pre-
treatment period. Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 for the period after 
2014:03 for columns (3) and (4). Post is the binary variable taking the value of 1 for 
the period after 2014:05 for columns (1) and (2). $ Total Spending is the summation 
of $ cash and $ POS whose definitions are given in Table 1. For all the regressions, 
individual fixed effects and year-month fixed effects are imposed. The standard error 
is clustered at individual level. The standard error are reported in parentheses under 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
HLB*Post -26.77 -0.0283 -7.970 -0.0398
(post if after 2014:07) (24.17) (0.0859) (16.91) (0.0747)
constant 539.9*** 4.857*** 445.6*** 4.586***
(15.20) (0.0538) (13.29) (0.0512)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 33,166 33,166 37,492 37,492
R sqaured 0.307 0.426 0.343 0.448
Panel B: 201401/201404-201406
(1) (2) (3) (4)
$ Total Spending ln($ Total Spending) $ cash&POS ln ($ cash&POS)
HLB*Post 24.46 0.153 18.68 0.0277
(post if after 2014:03/2014:05) (47.08) (0.136) (25.91) (0.0955)
constant 539.9*** 4.857*** 445.6*** 4.586***
(13.81) (0.0437) (12.49) (0.0452)
Fixed Effect
No. of Obs 4,326 4,326 8,652 8,652
R sqaured 0.592 0.715 0.506 0.635
individual, year-month
individual, year-month
